SACRAMENTO POLICE OFFICER DEFEATS CITY AT COURT OF APPEAL
By David E. Mastagni

The Third District Court of Appeal has upheld the reinstatement of Sacramento Police Officer Daniel Farnsworth, ending over three years of litigation and marking a major defeat for efforts by the City of Sacramento to fight the officer's return to work

Farnsworth Reinstated by Trial Court

Officer Farnsworth was dismissed May 15, 2001, when the City of Sacramento Civil Service Board upheld his termination despite striking all charges against him except those involving preparation of allegedly false search warrants for controlled narcotics buys. The Board alleged, without substantial evidence, that Officer Farnsworth had intentionally used incorrect dates in his warrant affidavits.

As reported in the Spring 2003 Mastagni, Holstedt & Amick Labor Bulletin, we filed a successful mandamus petition challenging the Board's decision. Superior Court Judge Talmadge Jones found the weight of the evidence did not support the findings of the administrative law judge; specifically, he found the discrepancies in the warrants were minor and determined Farnsworth had no motive to lie in the affidavits. He decided the evidence supported only a finding of negligence, or carelessness, and ordered Farnsworth reinstated with back pay and benefits subject to any suspension the Civil Service Board might impose on remand.

City Appeals Superior Court Decision

But the City appealed the writ of mandate to the Third District Court of Appeal and refused to comply with the reinstatement order, claiming the appeal stayed, or stopped, the court's order from issuing. Facing possible contempt of court, the City grudgingly complied with the court order by setting a hearing before the Civil Service Board to reconsider the penalty. The Board rejected the City's argument for a multi-year suspension or demotion to CSO, instead imposing a brief suspension.

The City immediately filed a "writ of supersedeas," a legal mechanism to stop the court's order from being executed, and requested the reinstatement and back-pay order be stayed pending the appeal. We opposed the writ because Officer Farnsworth would suffer irreparable injury if he was left unemployed and unemployable while the City's appeal was pending. On May 2, 2003, the Court of Appeal rejected the writ and denied the City's application for the stay.

City Tries to Abrogate the "Independent Judgment" Standard of Review

A mandamus petition like the one we brought on Farnsworth's behalf calls for the superior court to exercise its "independent judgment" to determine whether the findings made by the employing agency are supported by the evidence presented at the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(c).) In Fukuda v. City of Los Angeles (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, the California Supreme Court said trial courts reviewing administrative decisions under the "independent judgment" standard "must afford a strong presumption of correctness" to the findings made by the employing agency. The presumption, however, is only a "starting point for review" and may be overcome by proof the findings do not support the agency's decision.

Seeking to turn these longstanding rules upside down, the City of Sacramento argued on appeal in this case that Judge Jones had failed to perform an independent review of the record correctly because he did not afford the Civil Service Board decision a strong enough "presumption of correctness." The City tried to persuade the Court of Appeal the Fukuda rule means a civil service board's decision could "rarely, if ever" be overturned through independent judgment review.

The City confused the rules for judicial review even further by arguing the presumption of correctness afforded by Fukuda required Farnsworth, not the City, to demonstrate the decision was not supported by "substantial evidence". The "substantial evidence" standard, however, applies to review by the Court of Appeal, not by the trial court. The City appeared to argue language in Fukuda suggesting the trial court must find an abuse of discretion before it can substitute its judgment for the findings of the agency required the Superior Court to uphold the Board's decision.

Court of Appeal Finds City Waived Any Claim the Decision

Was Not Supported by "Substantial Evidence"

On appeal, the trial court decision must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is evidence of "ponderable legal significance . . . reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value" and "relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 225) Even when more than one inference can be reasonably deduced from the facts, the appellate court cannot substitute its deductions for those of the superior court. (Green v. Board of Dental Examiners (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 786, 796; Mann v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at 321.)

At the Court of Appeal, Officer Farnsworth argued the superior court decision in his case was supported by substantial evidence. The City never addressed this threshold issue, instead arguing the appellate court was prohibited from scrutinizing the record for substantial evidence because the alleged misapplication of independent judgment somehow infused the analysis of the trial court with error. The Court of Appeal interpreted this argument as a waiver of the claim substantial evidence did not support the decision of the Superior Court.

Court of Appeal Rejects City's Arguments

During oral argument before the Court of Appeal, I demonstrated Judge Jones had applied independent judgment review properly. He had given due deference to the City's decision, had addressed all the material findings made by the Board, and had considered the sustained findings of negligence in remanding the case to affix a lesser penalty for that charge.

Justice Arthur Scotland, the Presiding Justice of the Third District Court of Appeal, corrected the City's misstatements as to the effect of the presumption of correctness. The presumption, he stated, applies the burden of proof to the appellant to demonstrate the administrative findings are incorrect. The Court affirmed our interpretation of independent judgment review. Justice Scotland agreed the trial court had addressed all material issues and affirmed the judgment.

The opinion of the Presiding Justice of the Third District Court of Appeal was a significant repudiation of the City's overt attempt to erode the right of public employees to seek independent judgment review of administrative decisions. Independent judgment review often provides officers subject to a civil service board the only truly impartial review of a disciplinary action. Independent judgement review provides review under a much less deferential standard than most appeals. As a result, independent judgment provides officers a meaningful opportunity to reverse erroneous civil service decisions and disciplinary actions.

Justice Scotland's clarification as to the operation of independent judgment should discourage the type of endless appeals Farnsworth faced. Officer Farnsworth has subsequently returned to patrol and looks forward to continuing his career as a Sacramento Police Officer.